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This paper estimates a wage equation that includes worker- and firm fixed effects 
simultaneously,  using  a  longitudinal  matched  employer-employee  dataset  covering 
virtually all Portuguese employees over a little more than two-decades. The exercise 
is  performed  under  optimal  conditions  by  using  (a)  data  covering  the  whole 
population of employees and (b) adequate econometric methods and algorithms. The 
variation in log real hourly wages is then decomposed into six different components 
related  to  worker  and  firm  characteristics  (either  observed  or  unobserved)  and  a 
residual component. It is found that worker heterogeneity is the most important source 
of  wage  variation  (46.2  percent),  due  in  roughly  equal  parts  to  the  unobserved 
component (24.2 percent) and the observed component (22 percent). Firm effects are 
less important overall (29.6%), although firms’ observed characteristics do play an 
important role (14.8) in explaining wage differentials. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
An  important  research  theme  in  labor  economics  is  why  similar  workers  receive 
different  remuneration  and  why  similar  firms  pay  different  wages.  There  are  two 
major approaches to explaining observed wage variability, one of which relies on the 
supply-side determinants of wages  (viz. workers’ characteristics) and the other on 
demand-side  factors  (their  employers’  characteristics).  Empirically,  the  strength  of 
each explanation can only be assessed if the characteristics of firms and workers, both 
observed  and  unobserved,  are  simultaneously  accommodated  in  wage  equation 
estimates. 
However, the requirements of any such decomposition exercise are daunting; 
specifically, the availability of longitudinal datasets combining information on firms 
and  their  employees  (namely,  matched  employer-employee  datasets  with  unique 
identifiers for firms and workers) and the use of appropriate panel data econometric 
techniques to estimate two fixed effects – worker- and firm fixed effects – in wage 
equations. If either element is missing, it is impossible correctly to disentangle the 
effects of employers’ decisions from the effects of choices made by workers in the 
explanation of wage variability. Fortunately, panel datasets have become available in 
recent years for many countries, while econometric tools (and computing capacity) 
have  also  improved  greatly.  Taken  in  conjunction,  all  these  ingredients  –  data, 
econometric techniques, and computing facilities – have made it possible to bring new 
information to bear in the empirical debate on (many aspects of) wage determinants. 
In particular, in their pioneering work using a French longitudinal matched employer-
employee dataset, Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) were the first to propose an 
empirical framework for estimating worker and firm effects in wage equations. They 
reported that worker characteristics explained the major part of wage differentials, of 
inter-industry wage differentials, and of firm-size wage differentials. 
In the present treatment, we use a longitudinal matched employer-employee 
dataset covering virtually all employees in Portugal. Our dataset contains a total of a 
little over 27 million observations, 1986-2006, drawn from 600,000 firms and 5.5 
million workers. In estimating a wage equation that includes worker and firm effects, 
we use a routine that was especially developed in STATA providing an exact solution 
to  the  least  squares  problem  that  arises  when  dealing  with  very  high  dimension 
matrices. To our knowledge, this exercise is performed for the first time under optimal 3 
 
conditions; to repeat, universal coverage of the employed population and the use of 
adequate econometric tools. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. By way of motivation for worker and firm 
fixed effects, respectively, some basic theoretical justifications for supply-side and 
demand-side  determinants  are  first  sketched  in  Section  II.  The  general  empirical 
framework necessary to estimate wage equations with worker and firm fixed effects is 
next  established  in  Section  III.  A  data  description  and  barebones  review  of  wage 
setting in Portugal is contained in Section IV. Wage variability is decomposed into its 
six  components  in  Section  V,  the  determinants  of  worker  and  firm  fixed  effects 
investigated, and correlations between the components of compensation addressed. 
Section  VI  assesses  the  relationship  between  firms’  wage  policies  and  their 




In a labor market operating under perfect competition, each worker should receive a 
wage that equals his or her marginal (revenue) product. Wage differentials should 
reflect  differences  in  worker  productivity  and  not  depend  on  job  or  employer 
attributes  (other  than  those  affecting  worker  utility  such  as  dangerous  working 
conditions that will in normal circumstances attract a compensating differential). In 
turn,  worker  productivity  has  a  basis  in  competence  (whether  observed  or  not), 
typically ‘acquired’ through investments in human capital. (Here we are abstract from 
unobserved intrinsic ability, and ignore related signaling models.) Workers are thus 
depicted  as  investing  in  their  education  –  a  process  analogous  to  investments  in 
physical capita – that subsequently yield a payoff in higher earnings. Earnings depend 
then  upon  absolute  levels  of  education,  where  the  latter  will  include  post-school 
investments.   
Familiarly,  assessment  of  the  overall  effect  of  education  on  earnings  is 
conducted via the estimation of Mincerian earnings functions. In general, the first 
wave of empirical research relied on supply-side explanations for wage differentials 
and used ordinary least squares estimators and cross-section data.
1 Despite the finding 
of positive well-determined associations between human capital variables and wages, 
such research was typically unable to explain more than 30 percent of the variance in 
wages, meaning that 70 percent was left unexplained.
2 And even the second wave of 4 
 
empirical research, using econometric techniques applied to panel data to deal with 
unobserved  worker  heterogeneity,  still  left  much  of  the  variance  in  wages 
unexplained. 
There is no shortage of models seeking additional or alternative explanations 
for wage variability, but in each case the characteristics of firms rather than those of 
workers  (i.e.  worker  competence  or  productivity  differences)  assume  prime 
importance. Given the plethora of such treatments,
3 we choose to focus here on just 
two  of  them  that  pose  perhaps  the  sharpest  contrast  with  competitive  market 
conditions.  The  first  approach  has  a  basis  in  rent  sharing/insider-outsider 
considerations, while the second emphasizes labor market frictions.  
Rent-sharing models predict that wages depend on employers’ ability to pay. 
In particular, wages are predicted to have a positive correlation with firm profits, since 
firms may find it profitable to share their gains with their workers and pay above the 
going rate.
4 Recall that  in the competitive framework of the standard neoclassical 
labor market model, wages do not depend on the firms’ profits; rather, workers should 
simply be paid the market-determined opportunity cost of their time. Closely related 
to the notion of rent sharing is the insider-outsider model, in which there is a conflict 
of interest between the firm’s insiders (viz. incumbent employees whose positions are 
safeguarded  by  labor  turnover  costs)  and  outsiders  comprising  the  unemployed  or 
employees working in the informal, competitive sectors of the labor market (see, for 
example,  Blanchflower,  Oswald,  and  Garret,  1990).  Such  models  show  how  the 
different types of labor turnover costs borne by firms grant insiders market power and 
how  they  then  use  it  to  increase  their  wages.  Among  other  things,  these  models 
explain why wages depend not only on external labor market conditions but also on 
the  conditions  inside  the  firm  –  including  its  productivity,  profits,  degree  of 
competition, turnover costs and the bargaining strength of workers – and why the 
wages of workers from different groups of occupations, education and seniority are 
higher in some firms or industries than in others. In general, this family of models 
predicts  that  the  firms’  decisions  also  have  an  influence  on  wages,  providing  a 
justification  for  including  firm  characteristics  alongside  worker  characteristics  in 
wage equations. 
The  other  explanation  for  wage  differentials  among  workers  with  similar 
characteristics considered here derives from the job search and matching literature and 
emphasizes  the  role  of  labor  market  frictions  in  wage  determination.  Thus,  the 5 
 
equilibrium job search model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) predicts that firms 
may have incentives to offer higher wages than their competitors in order to guarantee 
a low quit rate and attract a large number of workers in a market characterized by the 
existence of frictions – even in circumstances of homogeneous workers and firms ex-
ante. This model predicts that wages are increasing in firm size and workers’ job 
seniority.  Modifications  of  the  Burdett  and  Mortensen  model  either  permit  firm 
heterogeneity  or  allow  firms  to  make  counter-offers  to  those  employees  who  are 
offered  better-paying  jobs  elsewhere  in  conjunction  with  firm  (and  worker) 
heterogeneity. Thus, allowing firms to differ in productivity, van den Berg and Ridder 
(1998) and Bontemps, Robin, and van den Berg (1999, 2000) show how the more 
productive firms offer higher wages. And in a model in which firms follow different 
wage  policies  and  internal  wage  differentiation,  Postel-Vinay  and  Robin  (2002) 
demonstrate  that  allowing  firms  to  make  counter-offers  wage  to  forestall  turnover 
yields a predicted wage distribution that is close to that observed in practice. But in 
each case, firm characteristics assume critical importance.  
For their part, matching models that also take into account the existence of 
frictions  in  the  labor  market  provide  an  explanation  for  wage  dispersion.  In  the  
models  of  Diamond  (1982),  Mortensen  (1986),  Pissarides  (1985,  2000),  and 
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) the wage paid is set by the employer, but workers 
and firms bargain the share of the matching rent after they meet (ex-post). Differences 
in match productivity, then, explain why similar workers (firms) may receive (pay) 
different wages.
5 
In short, theoretical explanations for wage differentials have been posited not 
only  on  supply-side  or  worker  characteristics  but  also  on  demand-side  or  firm 
characteristics. The bottom-line challenge is to include both in wage regressions, the 
task of the present treatment.  
 
III. The General Empirical Framework to Measure Wage Differentials 
 
The methodology applied in this paper parallels that initially developed by Abowd 
and Kramarz (1999) and Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), who presented a 
statistical  framework  permitting  worker  and  firm  fixed  effects  to  be  estimated 
simultaneously  in  wage  regressions.  However,  as  noted  earlier,  and  as  elaborated 
upon below, we shall use a different algorithm to obtain an exact solution for the 6 
 
estimation problem. 
The linear wage equation to be estimated has the form: 
ijt j i ijt ijt X w e j q b + + + = ln ,  (1) 
known in the statistical literature as  a “two-factor analysis of covariance.”  In this 
equation,  ijt w ln   is  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  real  hourly  wage  of  individual  i 
( N ,..., 1 i = )  working  at  firm  j  ( J j ,..., 1 = )  at  date  t  ( i T ,..., 1 t = ).  There  are  i T  
observations for each individual i and a total of 
* N  observations.  ijt X  is a vector of k 
observed (measured) time-varying exogenous characteristics of individual i.  i q  is the 
person or worker fixed effect (capturing unobserved individual heterogeneity), and  j j  
is  the  firm  fixed  effect  (capturing  unobserved  firm  heterogeneity)  for  the  firm  at 
which  worker  i  is  employed.  Wage  heterogeneity  is  related  to  both  permanent 
unmeasured differences in employees and to permanent unmeasured differences in 
firms. According to this equation, there are four components that explain the wage 
variability: 
1.  the observed time-varying characteristics of workers ( b ijt X ); 
2.  the workers’ heterogeneity or worker fixed effects ( i q ); 
3.  the firms’ heterogeneity or firm fixed effects ( j j ); and, 
4.  a residual component ( ijt e ) that we assume to follow the standard assumptions. 
In matrix notation, the stacked system has the form: 
ε F Dθ Xβ Y + + + = j .  (2) 
In this equation Y  is a  ) 1 (
*´ N  vector of real hourly wage (in logs), X  is a  ) k N (
* ´  
matrix with k observed time-varying characteristics of individuals,  D is a  ) N N (
* ´  
design matrix for the person effects,  F is a  ) J N (
* ´  design matrix for the firm 
effects,  θ is a  ) 1 N ( ´  vector of person effects, j  is a  ) 1 J ( ´  vector of firm effects 
and ε is a  ) 1 N (
* ´  vector of disturbances (we assume that mobility is exogenous, in 
order  to  make  the  design  matrices  orthogonal  to  the  disturbances  vector).  All 
vectors/matrices  (Y ,  X ,  D,  and  F)  have  row  dimensionality  equal  to  the  total 
number of observations (
* N ). 
Equations (1) and (2) can be interpreted as the conditional expectation of real 7 
 
hourly wage given the observable characteristics of workers, the date of observation, 
and the identity of both individuals and employing firms. Thus, the total number of 
parameters to be estimated is  J N k + + . However, it will not be possible to identify 
all firm and worker fixed effects. Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) show that in 
order to identify the firm and worker fixed effects one needs to impose G restrictions 
on the parameters, where G is the number of “mobility groups,” that is, the number of 
groups of connected firms and individuals.   
The full least squares solution to estimate the parameters in (1) solves the 





































F F' D F' X F'
F D' D D' X D'
F X' D X' X X'
j
  (3) 
Application  of  the  conventional  least  squares  formula  to  estimate  all  parameters 
(worker fixed effects, firm fixed effects, and the coefficients of all observed time-
varying  worker  characteristics)  requires  the  inversion  of  a  high  dimension  matrix. 
This  is  impossible  to  achieve  using  standard  software  and  present-day  computers. 
Accordingly, special algorithms are required to estimate the full model parameters. 
Abowd  and  Kramarz  (1999)  and  Abowd,  Kramarz,  and  Margolis  (1999) 
proposed  an  approximate  statistical  solution  that  corresponds  to  using  conditional 
estimation methods (based on a conditioning effects matrix, Z) providing estimators 
that are as similar as possible to full least squares, but computationally tractable. More 
recently,  Abowd,  Creecy,  and  Kramarz  (2003)  have  developed  an  algorithm  that 
permits an exact solution of the least squares estimation of equations such as (1). The 
user-written command a2reg is the Stata implementation of this algorithm. 
However, using this command to estimate our wage equation (3.1) with close 
to  27 million observations, 22 explanatory variables, and two high-dimensional fixed 
effects (c. 567,000 firms and 5.5 million workers) failed due to memory limitations 
(even in a computer with 8 Gigabytes of RAM and running Stata MP for Windows). 
We therefore followed an alternative methodology that was able to provide estimates 
for  the  regression  coefficients  and  for  both  fixed  effects.  This  procedure  was 
developed by Guimarães and Portugal (2010) for the estimation of linear regression 
models with two high-dimensional fixed effects. In brief, this methodology is based 
on a partitioned algorithm strategy, follows an iterative procedure, and provides an 8 
 
exact solution to the least squares problem. While computationally intensive given its 
iterative nature, this approach nevertheless imposes minimum memory requirements. 
A detailed description of this methodology and how it can be implemented to estimate 
equation  (1)  is  remitted  to  the  Appendix.  The  publicly  available  user-written 
command reg2hdfe is a Stata implementation of the approach. 
 
IV. The Data and the Institutional Wage Setting  
Data 
The Portuguese data used in this inquiry come from a longitudinal matched employer-
employee dataset known as the Tables of Personnel (or Quadros de Pessoal) for the 
years 1986 to 2006 (excepting 1990 and 2001). This unique dataset was created by the 
Portuguese Ministry of Employment and is taken from a mandatory survey annual 
survey addressed to firms with wage earners. The survey covers various firm and 
establishment characteristics, as well as a set of characteristics of the workforce (see 
below). Being compulsory, it does not suffer from the non-response problems that 
often plague standard household and firm surveys. Further, as noted earlier, the survey 
covers  almost  all  Portuguese  employees,  outside  of  Public  Administration  and 
domestic servants. Apart from the advantage of its comprehensive coverage, it is also 
generally recognized that dataset is reliable by virtue of its public availability. 
Turning  to  specifics,  the  dataset  includes  information  on  the  establishment 
(establishment  identifier,  location,  industry,  and  employment),  the  firm  (firm 
identifier, location, industry, legal form, ownership, year of formation, employment, 
sales, and capital), and its worker (social security identifier, gender, age, education, 
skills,  occupation,  employment  status,  professional  level,  seniority,  earnings  {base 
wage, seniority-related earnings, other regular and irregular benefits, and overtime 
pay}, normal and overtime hours, time elapsed since last promotion, and classification 
in the collective bargaining agreement). 
For the purposes of this exercise, a subset of variables was selected, certain 
new  variables  created,  and  some  observations  removed.  The  final  set  of  variables 
retained for analysis is given in Table A.1. Among the restrictions placed on the data 
were the excision of those individuals who were not working full time, who were aged 
less than 18 years and more than 60 years, who earned a nominal wage less than 80 
percent of the legal minimum wage or above the 99.9 percent quantile in each year; 
and who recorded errors in admission/birth dates, duplicate social security codes or 9 
 
other errors in their social security codes.
6 The final dataset for the entire period (all 
19 available years) comprises 26,960,952 observations drawn from 567,739 different 
firms  and  5,492,332  individual  workers.  Descriptive  statistics  for  the  continuous 
(categorical) variables are provided in Tables A.2, A.3 and A4. 
Institutional Setting 
Over our sample period, the wage bargaining system in Portugal is conventionally 
characterized  as  having  displayed  a  high  degree  of  centralization  and  a  moderate 
degree of coordination (OECD, 1997). Insofar as wages are concerned, the greater 
centralization that occurred since the mid-1980s via the agency of social pacts has 
involved indicative wage guidelines for the national average wage increase. Although 
these shape the ensuing collective bargaining, the latter still reflects the backdrop of 
decentralized employers’ and workers’ organization within their confederate bodies. 
That  said,  collective  bargaining  in  Portugal  mainly  takes  place  at  sectoral 
level. Voluntary and mandatory extensions are commonplace. The former occur when 
one side subscribes to an agreement to which was not a party (and gains the approval 
of  the  other  side),  or  more  typically  when  employers  extend  the  coverage  of  an 
agreement  they  have  signed  with  a  particular  union  to  the  entire  workforce. 
Mandatory extension by state fiat is also widespread and applies in circumstances 
where  workers  are  unorganized  or  where  bargaining  for  some  reason  fails.  Note, 
however, that sectoral agreements may only have an occupational scope within the 
industry  so  that  there  is  often  more  than  one  contract  within  a  sector,  reflecting 
occupation, region, trade union affiliations or some combinations of these alternatives. 
Firms can of course negotiate their own collective agreements with either one 
or a number of unions or several companies can come together to bargain with the 
trade unions.  But such formally decentralized wage bargaining is the exception rather 
than  the  rule.  Such  single-firm  and  multi-firm  bargains  as  opposed  to  sectoral 
contracts are largely restricted to public enterprises. Note that the recent increase in 
multi-firm  bargaining  among  joint  stock  companies  is  purely  the  result  of  a 
privatization/reorganization process occurring in such enterprises. 
Sectoral  bargaining  in  Portugal  differs  from  that  in  other  nations  because 
Portuguese  industrial  relations  are  characterized  by  fragmentation  and  multiple 
unionism. The corollary is that contents of collective agreements at once extensive 
and general. They are extensive in covering a large number of categories of worker 
but general in setting only minimum conditions for each – in particular, mean monthly 10 
 
wages  –  while  dealing  with  few  other  terms  and  conditions.  In  a  bargaining 
framework  that  sets  wage  levels  and  does  not  cover  projected  wage  growth, 
employers have a margin to adjust their wage policies to the prevailing economic 
conditions (see Cardoso and Portugal, 2005, for a discussion of the ramifications of 
this de facto decentralization). 
 
IV. The Role of Individual and Firm Heterogeneity in Wage Differentials 
 
In order to decompose wages variability into the six components identified earlier, we 
first  estimated  equation  (1),  where  our  explanatory  variables  (or  observed  time-
varying  characteristics)  are  firm  size,  age,  age  squared,  seniority,  and  seniority 
squared. We also included 18 year dummies. The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of the real hourly wage. The results are reported in Table 1. 
 
(Table 1 near here) 
 
 
Observe  that  the  R
2  of  this  equation  is  higher  than  in  standard  wage 
regressions. The  worker fixed effects, firm fixed effects, and worker time-varying 
characteristics together explain 91.4 percent of the variability in real wages. Wages 
increase with age and seniority at a decreasing rate, as expected. Larger firms pay 
higher wages.  
In this framework, the worker fixed effects ( i q ) include both the workers’ 
unobserved and observed but non-time-varying characteristics (such as gender and 
education; see note 7 below). Similarly, the firm fixed effects ( j j ) include both the 
firms’ unobserved and observed but non-time-varying characteristics (such as region, 
size, industry, etc.). 
We  next  decomposed  the  two  estimated  effects  ( i q   and  j j )  into  their 
respective  observed  and  unobserved  components,  by  estimating  the  following  two 
regression equations: 
i i i W . const ˆ e h q + + = ,  (4) 
where  i W   is  a  vector  of  non-time-varying  worker  characteristics  (gender  and  five 
education dummies), h is the associated vector of coefficients, and  h i W  is the worker 11 
 
non-time-varying observed characteristics effect. Note that  i a , the worker-specific 
intercept – which captures the worker unobserved characteristics effect and can be 
interpreted as the opportunity cost or the market valuation of worker heterogeneity – 
is obtained residually by  h q a ˆ W ˆ ˆ i i i - = ;  
and, 
j j j Z . const ˆ e l j + + = ,  (5) 
where  j Z  is a vector of non-time-varying firm characteristics (four region dummies, 
capital ownership {viz. share of domestic capital and share of public capital}, and 28 
industry dummies),  l  is the associated vector of coefficients, and  l i Z  is the firm 
non-time-varying  observed  characteristics  effect.
7 
j f ,  the  firm-specific  intercept 
(which captures the firm unobserved characteristics effect), is obtained residually, by 
l j f ˆ Z ˆ ˆ
j j j - = . 
We have now the following compensation components (besides the residual): 
￿  b ˆ Xit : observed firm and worker time-varying characteristics. 
￿  i ˆ q :  worker  effects  (include  the  observed  worker  non-time-varying 
characteristics and the unobserved worker characteristics). 
￿  h ˆ Wi : observed worker non-time-varying characteristics. 
￿  i ˆ a : unobserved worker characteristics. 
￿  j ˆ j : firm effects (include the observed firm non-time-varying characteristics 
and the unobserved firm characteristics). 
￿  l ˆ Z j : observed firm non-time-varying characteristics. 
￿  j ˆ f : unobserved firm characteristics. 
Tables 2 and 3 report the estimation results for the worker fixed effects and the 
firm fixed effects regressions, respectively, while Table 4 reports descriptive statistics 
for the components of real compensation by gender. 
 
(Table 2 near here) 
 
Beginning with Table 2, we observe that the worker fixed effect for females is, 12 
 
on average, 17.8 percent (=1 exp( 0.19647) - - ) smaller than for men, and that there is 
an  increasing  premium  associated  with  the  education  level:  a  worker  who  has 
completed  the  second  stage  of  tertiary  education  shows  a  fixed  effect  that  is,  on 
average, more than twice (1.3 times or ) 84417 . 0 exp( 1- ) that for a worker with pre-
primary or without any level of completed education (the reference category). Overall, 
these non-time-varying worker characteristics explain 38.4 percent of the variability 
in worker fixed effects. 
         
(Table 3 near here) 
 
    Similarly,  we  observe  that  the  geographic  location  of  the  firm,  its  capital 
ownership,  its  size  (number  of  employees),  and  the  industry  it  belongs  to  play 
important roles in explaining the differences in the firm fixed effects. Specifically, the 
firm fixed effects are on average larger in all NUTS II regions than in Norte (the 
reference category). Further, we observe that the firm fixed effects tend to be higher 
among firms with larger shares of non-domestic or non-public capital. Finally, there is 




(Table 4 near here) 
 
  Descriptive statistics for the components of real compensation by gender are 
provided in Table 4. For all the components of real compensation, the averages for 
males are higher than those for females (other than the predicted effect of individual 
time-varying characteristics, such as age and seniority). The gender differences are 
greater  for  the  worker  fixed  effects  component  than  for  the  firm  fixed  effects 
component (18.8 percent and 5.7 percent, respectively). Within each of these two 
components, gender differences are greater for the observed sub-components: 18.8 
percent  for  the  gender  and  education  sub-component  of  worker  fixed  effects 
component; and 4 percent for the firm sub-component of firm fixed effects related to 
the observed characteristics (viz. region, ownership as measured by share of domestic 
and of public capital, and industry). And in general, the variability of worker fixed 
effects is greater than the variability of firm fixed effects. Male workers exhibit higher 13 
 
variability  in  all  wage  components  (except  for  the  education  and  gender  sub-
component of worker fixed effects). 
          In Table 5, we report the correlations among the components of real hourly 
wages. Of the three main components – time-varying characteristics, worker fixed 
effects, and firm fixed effects – the worker fixed effects component shows the highest 
correlation  with  log  of  real  total  compensation  (0.76),  followed  by  the  firm  fixed 
effects component (0.67), and by the individual and firm time-varying characteristics 
component  (0.48).  Considering  the  components  within  the  firm  fixed  effects,  the 
observable part of the firm fixed effects is the most highly correlated with log of real 
total  compensation  (0.54).  The  unobserved  part  of  the  firm  component  is  less 
important  in  determining  total  compensation.  Both  observed  and  unobserved 
components of worker fixed effects are highly correlated with the log of real total 
compensation (0.58 and 0.51, respectively). Therefore, the observable part of each 
component is more highly correlated with the log of real total compensation than the 
unobservable part. 
 
(Table 5 near here) 
 
For  comparison  purposes,  abstracting  from  differences  in  estimation  method  and 
explanatory  variables  included  in  regressions  (1)  and  (2),  we  note  that  Abowd, 
Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) found that the unobserved part of the worker fixed 
effect  was  that  component  most  highly  correlated  with  the  log  of  real  total 
compensation (0.80 or 0.73, depending on the method), and that the firm components 
(either observed or unobserved) were much less important (0.21 or 0.26, depending on 
the estimation method). 
We also find that the correlation between the firms’ wage policies (as proxied  
by the firm fixed effects) and the quality of their workforce (captured by the worker 
fixed effects) is positive but not very large (0.27). However, it is much larger than that 
found  in  the  literature.  For  example,  using  the  ‘persons  first’  method,  Abowd, 
Kramarz,  and  Margolis  (1999),  report  a  correlation  of  0.11  (see  also  the  lower 
estimates of Goux and Maurin, 1999, using Cab or Force Survey (LFS) data). 
  The correlations in Table 5 also suggest an interpretation in terms of sorting. 
The matching and assignment literature includes models that predict complementarity 
between worker and firm levels of productivity, suggesting that good workers tend to 14 
 
be found in  good firms.
8 Our results are partly consistent with this literature (see 
|Barth  and  Olsen,  2003).  In  terms  of  the  observable  characteristics,  there  is  some 
evidence of positive assortative matching between workers and firms, the correlation 
coefficient between the corresponding components being 0.32. By the same token, we 
do  not  find  any  evidence  of  assortative  matching  in  terms  of  the  unobservable 
characteristics (the correlation is -0.04).
9 
On the whole, these results indicate that the relationship between firms’ wage 
policies and the quality of the workers they select is positive but weak and that there 
are certainly factors other than wage policies that explain the distribution of high-
ability workers across firms. 
Finally, to measure the contribution of worker and firms characteristics, both 
observed and unobserved, to wage variability, we used the following equation: 
∑
=




it it j j i i it it C Z W X w ln e l f h a b ,  (6) 
where 
p
it C   is  the  p
th  component  ( 6 ,..., 1 p = )  that  contributes  to  explaining  wage 
variability. The contribution of each component,
p
it C , is calculated by: 
) w (ln Var / ) C , w (ln Cov it
p
it it ,  (7) 





it it = ∑
=
. 
The largest contribution to wage variability comes from worker fixed effects (46.2 
percent), followed next by firm fixed effects (29.2 percent), and then by the firm and 
individual time-varying characteristics component (16.0 percent). There is therefore a 
residual  contribution  of  8.6  percent.  Among  the  worker  fixed  effects,  both 
subcomponents make a similar contribution (24.2 percent from the unobserved worker 
characteristics and 22.0 percent from the gender and education component). Among 
the firm fixed effects, the observed subcomponent contributes more (14.8 percent) 
than the unobserved subcomponent (14.4 percent). 
 
V.  The Relationship between Firms’ Wage Policies, Labor Force Quality, 
and Performance 
 
In this section, we seek to determine if the compensation policies followed by firms 
are related to their performance. As firms differ not only in the wage policies they 15 
 
follow, but also in the average quality of their labor force, we also attempt to ascertain 
whether employing high-wage workers has any relation with firm performance. 
To these ends, we estimated an equation in which the dependent variable is the 
log of sales per employee – a measure of productivity that gives some indication of 
firm  performance  –  and  where  the  explanatory  variables  are  the  averages,  across 
firms,  of  the  wage  components  estimated  in  the  previous  section,  namely  firms’ 
compensation  policy  components  ( j ˆ f   and  g ˆ Z j )  and  firms’  labor  force  quality 
components,  j it ) ˆ X ( b ,  j i ) ˆ (a , and  j it ) ˆ W ( h . The results of this exercise are shown in 
Table 6. 
          
(Table 6 near here) 
           
It would appear that productivity is positively affected by all compensation 
policy  components,  principally  by  the  worker  observed  characteristics  component 
(gender and education), by the worker unobserved characteristics component, and by 
the  firm  observed  characteristics  component  (region,  capital  ownership,  size,  and 
industry). Accordingly, high-wage workers (those with above-average worker fixed 
effects)  tend  to  work  in  firms  with  higher  productivity,  as  predicted  by  the  rent-
sharing model, inter al., and high-wage firms (those with above-average firm fixed 
effects) tend to be the most productive ones. 
Following  a  similar  procedure  for  France,  Abowd,  Kramarz,  and  Margolis 
(1999) have concluded that the major impact on firms’ productivity stems from the 
time-varying  observed  characteristics  of  their  workers,  followed  next  by  the 
unobserved component of the worker fixed effects, and then by the firm fixed effects 




In this exercise we have used a large longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset 
with close to 27 million observations to estimate a wage equation with both worker 
and firm fixed effects. Our approach was motivated by supply-side and demand-side 
arguments  taken  from  alternative  wage  determination  models  and  it  sought  at  a 
theoretical level to overcome major empirical frailties that arise when estimating wage 
equations  using  data  limited  on  at  least  one  dimension  –  either  firm/worker 16 
 
characteristics or the longitudinal dimension. 
We deployed an econometric technique that provides an exact solution to the 
least squares estimation problem arising when estimating simultaneously worker and 
firm fixed effects in wage equations with high-dimension datasets. We decomposed 
the log of real hourly wages into several components: observed worker time-varying 
characteristics,  worker  heterogeneity  (to  include  observed  non-time-varying 
characteristics  and  unobserved  characteristics),  firms  heterogeneity  (again  both  
observed  and  unobserved),  and  a  residual  component.  We  reported  that  worker 
heterogeneity  is  the  most  important  source  of  wages  variability  in  Portugal 
(contributing 46.2 percent) due in roughly equal parts to the unobserved component 
(24.2 percent) and to observed non-time-varying characteristics such as gender and 
education (22.0 percent). On the whole, firm effects were found to be less important  
(contributing 29.2 percent), although observed characteristics such as location, capital 
ownership, and industry play an important role in explaining wage differentials (14.8 
percent). 
We  also  reported  that  firms  hiring  ‘high-wage’  workers  and  paying  higher 
wages (‘high-wage’ firms) tend to be more productive firms. On the other hand, the 
the  connection  between  the  firms’  compensation  policies  and  the  quality  of  their 
workforces, in contrast with previous evidence, was shown to be positive. 
These  results  suggest  that  both  worker  characteristics  (observed  or 
unobserved, and which correspond to the wage component that is transferable from 
job  to  job)  and  firm  characteristics  (observed  or  unobserved,  which  reflect  the 
systematic differences in wages paid to similar individuals) each play important roles 
in explaining wage differentials in Portugal. The latter result provides some impetus 





1. Our maintained hypothesis is that returns to firm-specific training recouped through 
the tenure coefficient overstate the role of such investments. 
2.  Mortensen  (2003)  refers  to  this  degree  of  unexplained  variability  as  “wage 
dispersion.” 
3. The reader is directed toward implicit contract theory, principal-agent models, and 
efficiency wage theories. 
4. The earliest rent-sharing studies used industry data (see, for example, Dickens and 
Katz, 1986). Firm studies constituted the next phase (e.g. Hildreth and Oswald, 1997; 
Arai, 2003). The most recent treatments have used matched employer-employee data 
to control for unobserved worker abilities (see, for example, Guertzgen, 2008; and, for 
an alternative approach, Card et al., 2009). 
5. For treatments combining both approaches – equilibrium job search and matching – 
see  Quercioli  (1998),  Robin  and  Roux  (1998),  and  Mortensen  (2000).  Recent 
extensions include Rosholm and Svarer (2004), and Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin 
(2005). 
6.  Individuals  employed  outside  of  mainland  Portugal  and  those  in  agriculture, 
hunting, forestry and fishing (as well as misclassified industries) were also excluded. 
7. We assume that the variables included in Z are structural characteristics of firms. 
Their changes over time are either nonexistent or too small to be considered time-
varying and to be included as explanatory variables directly in equation (1). The same 
reasoning applies to the education variable for workers in equation (4). Note further 
that the industry classification in Portugal changed in 1995. Because of this and given 
that the regression comprises the entire period, we constructed an aggregated common 
classification that comprises 29 different industries (see Table A.6). 
8. The idea is developed in Becker (1973), and a literature review is provided by 
Sattinger (1993). 
9. In their Norwegian study, Barth and Dale-Olsen (2003, Table 1) report a positive 
and significant correlation between the observables in the case of low-skilled workers 
and a negative and significant correlation between the unobservables for both low- 
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Annex: Implementing Estimation of the Parameters of the Wage Equation 
Here we describe how the algorithm developed by Guimarães and Portugal (2010) can 
be implemented to estimate the parameters of our wage equation defined in Section 
III, which has the following specification: 
ε F Dθ Xβ Y + + + = j .  (A.1) 
As stated previously,  Y  is a  ) 1 (
*´ N  vector of real hourly wage,  X  is a  ) k N (
* ´  
matrix  with  k  observed  time-varying  characteristics  of  individuals,  D  is  a  high-
dimensional  ) (
* N N ´  design matrix for the worker effects,  F is a  ) J N (
* ´  high-
dimensional  design  matrix  for  the  firm  effects,  and  ε  is  a  ) 1 N (
* ´   vector  of 
disturbances. 
Our goal is to estimate the k effects of the time-varying characteristics (vector 
β), as well as the N worker fixed effects (vector  θ) and the J firm fixed effects 
(vector j ). 
The one high-dimension fixed effect case 
As a starting point, consider equation (A.1) without firm fixed effects: 
ε Dθ Xβ Y + + = .  (A.2) 
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     This suggests an iterative estimation procedure. If  θ were known, the least 
squares estimates of  β would be obtained simply by regressing the variable  θ D Y
⌢
-  
on X. If, in turn, βwere known, the least squares estimates of θ would correspond to 
the  group  means  (across  workers)  of  the  elements  of  β X Y u
⌢
- = .  Therefore,  the 22 
 
strategy for estimating β and θ can be implemented in the following steps: 
1)  Run a regression of Y on X  to obtain starting values for β ; 
2)  Compute the residuals uusing the last estimate of β ; 
3)  Estimate θ as the group (worker) means of u; 
4)  Estimate  β  by running a regression of  Y on  X and an additional variable, 
Dθ , computed using the last estimates of θ ; and, 
5)  Return to step 2 and iterate until convergence. 
      Following this approach all that is required is the estimation of successive 
linear  regressions,  by  least  squares,  with  1 k +   explanatory  variables,  and  the 
computation of group means of the elements of uin each iteration. We do not need to 
be concerned about the dimension of  D, since the transformation  D' D) (D'
1 -  used to 
estimate θ corresponds to a group average and the expression Dθ used to estimate b  
is a column vector containing all the elements of  θ. With this strategy, we avoided 
the inversion of a large matrix that would be required if we had simply added  D to 
the set of regressors. 
The two high-dimension fixed effects case 
Turn now to the entire equation (A.1), including both worker and firm fixed effects. In 
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.  (A.6) 
The  partitioned  algorithm  can  be  easily  extended  to  accommodate  this  case,  by 
iterating between the estimation of β, θ and j . The algorithm will converge to the 
least squares solution but at a slow rate of convergence.  
In practice there are several steps that can be taken to speed up convergence. 
First, we can avoid estimation of one of the fixed effects by sweeping it out using the 
within transformation (fixed effects transformation). Second, we can use a standard 
acceleration technique by adjusting the trajectory of the estimates for the fixed effects. 
Finally, we can implement the regression in two steps using the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell 
theorem. In the first step we expurgate the two fixed effects from  Y and  X  while in 
the second step we run a regression of the transformed  Y on the transformedX . This 
regression will provide the correct least squares estimates for β as well as the correct 23 
 
standard  errors  (whether  or  not  clustered)  as  long  as  we  correct  the  degrees  of 
freedom  associated  with  the  estimate  of  the  variance  of  the  error  term.  For  more 






 Table 1: Fitted Wage Equation with Worker and Firm Fixed Effects
Coeficient t-statistic
Age (years) 0.02635  38.80
Age squared -0.00028 - 32.24
Seniority (years) 0.00928  23.66
Seniority squared -0.00021 - 16.69
Size (ln employees) 0.03477  19.44
Year 1987 0.05101  81.37
Year 1988 0.06704  81.59
Year 1989 0.08361  88.29
Year 1991 0.19075  141.31
Year 1992 0.23867  146.06
Year 1993 0.24625  123.10
Year 1994 0.27142  113.93
Year 1995 0.28178  102.01
Year 1996 0.29323  96.11
Year 1997 0.34041  94.92
Year 1998 0.38492  102.24
Year 1999 0.42510  106.56
Year 2000 0.43414  103.35
Year 2002 0.44985  88.91
Year 2003 0.45249  82.61
Year 2004 0.47934  83.70
Year 2005 0.48591  85.31
Year 2006 0.48225  86.76
Observations 26.960.952




First stage of basic education 0.09963 317.65
Second stage of basic education 0.23714 712.96
Secondary or post-secondary education 0.34360 1.035.55
First stage of tertiary education 0.73128 1.537.64
Second stage of tertiary education 0.84417 2.210.16
Observations 26.959.500







Share of domestic capital -0.00023 -236.92
Share of public capital 0.00043 210.52
Industry 2 -0.33036 -129.30
Industry 3 -0.46087 -183.08
Industry 4 -0.52404 -208.54
Industry 5 -0.52659 -208.90
Industry 6 -0.50678 -200.93
Industry 7 -0.35288 -139.87
Industry 8 0.13338 49.71
Industry 9 -0.23734 -93.87
Industry 10 -0.33906 -133.17
Industry 11 -0.35489 -140.80
Industry 12 -0.44184 -175.52
Industry 13 -0.38226 -151.45
Industry 14 -0.34407 -136.16
Industry 15 -0.36173 -143.27
Industry 16 -0.56387 -222.92
Industry 17 -0.14406 -56.81
Industry 18 -0.50326 -200.20
Industry 19 -0.45728 -181.99
Industry 20 -0.59757 -237.48
Industry 21 -0.33380 -132.89
Industry 22 -0.00190 -0.76
Industry 23 -0.41258 -163.98
Industry 24 -0.33207 -127.72
Industry 25 -0.39339 -155.55
Industry 26 -0.55098 -218.75
Industry 27 -0.41722 -165.39
Industry 28 -0.64545 -243.73














Log of real hourly wage (1986 prices) 0.37274 0.56410 0.14178 0.51165 0.28058 0.55541
Predicted effects of X variables (a) 1.07816 0.18522 1.07589 0.18349 1.07725 0.18453
Time 0.32302 0.14954 0.34119 0.14161 0.33027 0.14670
Time-varying observable characteristics of workers  0.59956 0.08133 0.58766 0.08218 0.59481 0.08188
Time-varying observable characteristics of firms 0.15554 0.07897 0.14704 0.07514 0.15215 0.07758
Worker fixed effects 0.06847 0.33445 -0.10352 0.31659 -0.00016 0.33810
Worker fixed effects: unobserved component 0.00000 0.27700 0.00000 0.24677 0.00000 0.26535
Worker fixed effects: observed component (b) 0.06847 0.18519 -0.10352 0.20147 -0.00016 0.20952
Firm fixed effects -0.77436 0.24559 -0.82987 0.23310 -0.79651 0.24221
Firm fixed effects: unobserved component 0.00637 0.19567 -0.00960 0.18745 0.00000 0.19259
Firm fixed effects: observed component (c) -0.78078 0.15009 -0.82022 0.14014 -0.79651 0.14747
Number of observations
Notes:
(b): Gender and education.
(c): Region, ownership and industry.
(a): Time-varying observable characteristics of workers (age, age squared, seniority and seniority squared), time-varying 
observable characteristics of firms (size) and years.
Male Female Total
16.202.276 10.757.224 26.959.500Table 5: Correlations between the Compensation Components
1 2 2.1 2.2 2.3 3 3.1 3.2 4 4.1 4.2 5
Log of real hourly wage (1986 prices) 1 1
Predicted effects of X variables (a) 2 0.48 1
Time 2.1 0.22 0.74 1
Time-varying observable characteristics of workers  2.2 0.32 0.55 0.02 1
Time-varying observable characteristics of firms 2.3 0.38 0.40 -0.15 0.21 1
Worker fixed effects 3 0.76 0.10 -0.02 0.12 0.15 1
Worker fixed effects: unobserved component 3.1 0.51 0.01 -0.07 0.18 0.11 0.78 1
Worker fixed effects: observed component (b) 3.2 0.58 0.15 0.06 -0.04 0.11 0.62 0.00 1
Firm fixed effects 4 0.67 0.20 -0.02 0.16 0.37 0.27 0.07 0.35 1
Firm fixed effects: unobserved component 4.1 0.43 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.09 -0.04 0.20 0.79 1
Firm fixed effects: observed component (c) 4.2 0.54 0.24 -0.03 0.18 0.43 0.33 0.16 0.32 0.61 0.00 1
Residual 5 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 1
Notes:
(b): Gender and education.
(c): Region, ownership and industry.
(a): Time-varying observable characteristics of workers (age, age squared, seniority and seniority squared), time-varying observable characteristics of 
firms (size) and years.Table 6: Performance Equation Results
Coeficient t-statistic
Constant 10.20949 3.145.79
Predicted effects of X variables (a) 0.31185 141.63
Time 0.66059 241.59
Time-varying observable characteristics of workers  1.52996 228.26
Time-varying observable characteristics of firms -0.60517 -163.27
Worker fixed effects: unobserved component 1.56513 775.57
Worker fixed effects: observed component (b) 2.19575 868.52
Firm fixed effects: unobserved component 1.44622 1.050.23
Firm fixed effects: observed component (c) 1.04209 492.83
Observations
R-squared
(b): Gender and education.
(c): Region, ownership and industry.
Dependent variable: Log of productivity 
(sales per employee)
(a): Time-varying observable characteristics of workers (age, age squared, seniority and seniority 
squared), time-varying observable characteristics of firms (size) and years.
24.707.576
0.19Table A.1: Variables Used and their Definition/Construction 
Variable  Description 
Year  Year of reference (from 1986 to 2006, except 1990 and 2001) 
Firm  Firm identification number 
Ss  Worker identification number (Social Security code) 
Workers’ characteristics: 
Gender  Gender (male and female) 




No formal education or below ISCED 1 
Primary education or first stage of basic education 
(ISCED 1) 
Lower secondary education or second stage of basic 
education (ISCED 2) 
(Upper) secondary education and post-secondary non-
tertiary education (ISCED 3 and 4) 
Tertiary level of education 1 (ISCED 5b) 
Tertiary level of education 2 (ISCED 5a and 6) 
Tenure  Tenure or seniority (number of months since admission) 
Compensation and hours: 
w1  Base wage (Euros per month) 
w2  Seniority payments (Euros per month) 
w3  Regular benefits (Euros per month) 
w4  Irregular benefits (Euros per month) 
w5  Overtime pay (Euros per month) 
hours1  Number of normal hours per month 
hours2  Number of extra hours per month 
Hw  Hourly wage (Euros). Computed as (w1+w2+w3+w5)/(hours1+hours2) 
real_hw  Real hourly wage (Euros). Deflator: Consumer Price Index (prices of 1986) 
ln_real_hw  Logarithm of real hourly wage 
Firms’ characteristics: 
employees  Number of employees in the firm 
ln_employees  Logarithm of the number of employees in the firm 
inds  Firm industry   
inds6 
Firm industry 
(6 sectors) – 
common 
classification from 
1986 to 2006 
Mining and quarrying (NACE Rev.1 activities 10 to 14) 
Manufacturing (NACE Rev.1 activities 15 to 37) 
Electricity, gas, and water supply (NACE Rev.1 
activities 40 to 41) 
Construction (NACE Rev.1 activities 45) 
Market services (NACE Rev.1 activities 50 to 74) 
Social services (NACE Rev.1 activities 80 to 99) inds29  Firm industry (29 sectors) – common classification from 1986 to 2006 







sales  Firm sales (Euros) 
real_sales  Real firm sales (Euros). Deflator: Consumer Price Index (prices of 1986) 
real_sales_employee  Real firm sales (Euros) per employee 
share_n  Firm percentage of domestic capital (0 – 100) 
share_p  Firm percentage of public capital (0 – 100) 
 


















 Table A.2: Means and standard deviations of continuous variables
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean
1986 1.1414 0.7204 0.0071 0.4606 35 11 113.4 95.0 1.686 4.583 5.1217 2.2447 65.9 46.1 15.4 35.1 31.9
1987 1.1935 0.7590 0.0478 0.4676 35 11 112.9 97.0 1.605 4.458 5.0666 2.2361 69.5 44.8 13.9 33.7 39.1
1988 1.1845 0.7705 0.0391 0.4685 35 11 108.6 98.6 1.502 4.351 4.9162 2.2336 69.6 44.9 12.5 32.2 39.0
1989 1.1989 0.8308 0.0411 0.4819 35 11 104.3 99.8 1.119 3.591 4.7820 2.1371 72.2 43.6 9.8 28.8 27.0
1991 1.4132 1.1025 0.1716 0.5349 35 11 101.8 103.0 1.307 4.045 4.8003 2.2117 70.7 44.3 11.3 30.9 39.0
1992 1.4897 1.2020 0.2148 0.5489 35 11 98.9 101.6 1.202 3.796 4.7138 2.1931 75.0 42.3 8.4 27.3 44.0
1993 1.5141 1.2643 0.2224 0.5595 35 11 98.6 100.7 951 2.784 4.6087 2.1621 72.9 43.3 7.6 25.9 49.4
1994 1.5584 1.3385 0.2428 0.5720 35 11 99.1 100.3 870 2.637 4.4600 2.1857 71.5 43.8 8.0 26.6 27.0
1995 1.5566 1.3193 0.2456 0.5648 35 11 100.6 101.7 845 2.573 4.4367 2.1822 73.5 42.8 5.5 22.0 35.7
1996 1.5754 1.3306 0.2588 0.5636 35 11 101.0 102.3 800 2.348 4.4278 2.1863 72.5 43.4 6.2 23.4 34.1
1997 1.5981 1.3146 0.2843 0.5462 36 11 96.5 101.1 762 2.281 4.3227 2.1822 71.3 44.1 5.2 21.4 32.2
1998 1.6922 1.3817 0.3397 0.5497 36 11 97.2 102.9 802 2.339 4.3480 2.2211 71.5 43.9 5.0 20.8 48.8
1999 1.7384 1.4277 0.3662 0.5489 36 10 96.1 102.2 777 2.290 4.2810 2.2160 71.5 44.0 4.6 20.2 36.2
2000 1.7274 1.3993 0.3655 0.5406 36 10 91.6 100.7 793 2.338 4.1969 2.2233 71.2 44.1 4.1 19.2 32.5
2002 1.7497 1.4174 0.3772 0.5430 36 10 86.8 98.0 728 2.204 4.0565 2.2293 71.9 44.0 4.0 19.0 40.1
2003 1.7574 1.4505 0.3780 0.5471 37 10 88.2 96.6 656 1.998 4.0082 2.2141 72.8 43.6 3.5 17.8 39.7
2004 1.8183 1.5302 0.4045 0.5575 37 10 90.0 96.2 626 1.873 4.0074 2.2089 73.2 43.4 3.3 17.2 36.6
2005 1.8177 1.5430 0.4029 0.5589 37 10 89.0 95.3 623 1.905 3.9701 2.2130 72.3 43.9 3.1 16.7 32.0
2006 1.8157 1.5261 0.4022 0.5593 37 10 89.7 95.3 690 2.094 4.0062 2.2400 71.7 44.1 3.5 17.7 50.8
1986-2006 1.6012 1.3356 0.2806 0.5557 36 11 96.6 99.6 902 2.834 4.3733 2.2342 71.8 43.9 6.4 23.7 37.9
real_hw ln_real_hw






Years MonthsTable A.3: Distribution across categories of categorical variables (%)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1986-
gender 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Male 66.9 66.8 65.8 64.5 63.4 62.3 62.2 60.6 60.1 60.3 59.0 58.7 58.1 57.8 58.4 57.9 57.8 57.3 56.7 60.1
Female 33.1 33.2 34.2 35.5 36.6 37.7 37.8 39.4 39.9 39.7 41.0 41.3 41.9 42.2 41.6 42.1 42.2 42.7 43.3 39.9
educ 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pre-primary or no 
education
7.7 7.1 6.2 5.6 4.3 4.0 3.6 2.8 2.4 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.2 2.8
First stage of basic 
education
71.7 71.9 72.7 71.7 68.3 67.1 66.2 64.6 64.0 62.1 61.2 58.8 57.8 55.9 50.7 48.7 46.7 44.6 42.0 58.3
Second stage of basic 
education
6.9 7.3 7.7 8.4 10.5 11.1 11.6 15.0 14.9 15.3 15.3 16.1 16.3 17.0 19.1 20.0 21.0 21.7 22.4 15.6
Secondary or post-
secondary education
10.8 10.8 10.5 11.3 13.1 13.7 14.2 13.0 13.7 14.8 15.6 16.6 17.3 17.9 19.1 19.5 20.1 20.6 21.7 16.2
First stage of tertiary 
education
1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.1 1.9 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.0
Second stage of tertiary 
education
1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.3 2.6 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.6 3.9 4.6 4.9 5.7 7.0 7.6 8.1 9.1 10.2 5.0
inds6 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Mining and quarrying 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6
Manufacturing 52.7 53.1 52.5 52.4 47.9 46.4 45.2 42.0 42.6 41.9 40.1 38.4 37.9 35.6 30.9 29.6 29.0 27.4 26.2 38.8
Electricity, gas, and water 
supply
1.8 1.7 1.7 0.7 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.0
Construction 7.7 7.9 8.0 8.6 8.8 8.8 9.0 9.0 9.1 9.4 9.7 9.6 9.6 10.6 12.1 11.5 11.5 11.6 11.3 9.9
Market services 31.3 31.2 31.5 31.6 34.8 35.9 36.8 38.9 40.7 41.1 41.2 42.8 42.9 43.8 45.6 46.9 47.1 46.9 47.5 41.1
Social services 5.6 5.4 5.5 5.9 6.3 6.8 7.2 8.2 5.8 5.9 7.3 7.6 8.0 8.6 10.3 10.9 11.4 13.0 13.9 8.6
size 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
< 5 employees 4.0 4.2 4.7 4.9 5.3 5.6 6.1 7.4 7.7 8.0 8.6 8.9 9.2 9.8 10.7 11.6 11.9 12.3 12.3 8.7
5-9 employees 6.3 6.4 7.1 7.4 7.5 7.8 8.3 9.4 9.6 9.7 10.3 10.4 10.7 11.2 12.5 12.7 12.6 12.6 12.3 10.2
10-49 employees 21.8 22.4 23.9 24.7 24.6 25.4 26.1 27.2 26.7 26.4 27.3 27.0 27.6 28.4 30.7 29.2 28.6 29.0 28.8 27.1
50-99 employees 10.9 11.2 11.6 11.9 12.1 12.1 12.3 12.0 12.1 11.7 12.1 11.5 11.5 11.7 10.0 10.8 10.8 10.7 10.6 11.4
100-249 employees 15.0 14.9 15.3 15.1 14.6 15.1 14.9 13.7 13.9 14.0 13.7 13.6 13.3 12.9 11.6 11.6 12.0 11.6 11.9 13.3
250-499 employees 11.0 10.5 10.1 10.7 9.9 9.7 9.4 9.1 9.1 8.5 8.2 7.9 7.7 7.4 6.8 6.8 6.9 6.8 6.7 8.3
500-999 employees 10.0 10.4 9.1 8.7 8.7 7.5 6.9 5.7 6.1 6.3 5.9 5.7 5.4 4.9 4.5 4.6 4.8 5.0 5.0 6.2
1,000-1,999 employees 6.9 6.4 5.7 6.0 4.8 5.3 4.9 5.1 5.1 4.8 3.9 4.3 4.9 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.0 4.1 4.8
2,000-4,999 employees 5.9 5.6 5.0 5.2 6.6 6.1 6.0 6.1 6.0 7.3 6.2 6.5 5.1 3.3 3.8 4.0 4.4 4.1 3.4 5.2
≥ 5,000 employees 8.2 7.9 7.6 5.3 5.9 5.4 5.1 4.3 3.8 3.2 3.8 4.3 4.6 5.6 4.9 4.1 3.6 3.9 4.8 4.9
region 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Norte 38.8 38.8 39.5 40.0 38.7 38.4 37.5 38.1 38.9 38.2 38.6 36.8 37.7 36.7 35.3 34.8 34.8 35.0 35.1 37.1
Centro 13.5 14.3 15.3 16.0 16.1 16.3 17.4 17.3 17.4 17.9 17.9 18.4 18.3 18.6 19.1 19.0 19.0 19.1 19.0 17.7
Lisboa 43.0 42.1 39.9 38.6 39.5 39.4 39.1 38.3 37.4 37.3 36.5 37.5 36.7 37.1 37.5 37.7 37.6 37.3 37.3 38.1
Alentejo 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.1
Algarve 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.5 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.9 2.9Table A.4: Further descriptive statistics on real hourly wages (real_hw)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1986-2006
Mean 1.1414 1.1935 1.1845 1.1989 1.4132 1.4897 1.5141 1.5584 1.5566 1.5754 1.5981 1.6922 1.7384 1.7274 1.7497 1.7574 1.8183 1.8177 1.8157 1.6012
Stdandard deviation 0.7204 0.7590 0.7705 0.8308 1.1025 1.2020 1.2643 1.3385 1.3193 1.3306 1.3146 1.3817 1.4277 1.3993 1.4174 1.4505 1.5302 1.5430 1.5261 1.3356
Variance 0.5189 0.5760 0.5937 0.6903 1.2155 1.4449 1.5985 1.7916 1.7406 1.7705 1.7282 1.9092 2.0384 1.9580 2.0089 2.1039 2.3414 2.3807 2.3289 1.7838
Coefficient of variation 0.6311 0.6359 0.6505 0.6930 0.7801 0.8069 0.8350 0.8589 0.8476 0.8446 0.8226 0.8165 0.8213 0.8101 0.8100 0.8254 0.8415 0.8488 0.8405 0.8341
Skewness 3.9 3.3 3.9 4.1 3.8 3.9 3.9 5.2 4.1 4.0 4.2 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.7 4.0 3.8 4.7 3.7 4.2
Kurtosis 53.4 28.6 41.1 38.8 28.2 30.4 27.8 120.3 34.0 32.7 38.8 29.6 29.2 29.8 25.0 30.2 25.8 148.4 24.5 51.1
Percentiles
1 0.5164 0.5475 0.5391 0.5401 0.5919 0.5805 0.5877 0.5960 0.6149 0.6155 0.6462 0.7040 0.7252 0.7289 0.7364 0.7329 0.7358 0.7348 0.7371 0.5925
5 0.5870 0.6065 0.5912 0.5887 0.6381 0.6522 0.6443 0.6458 0.6598 0.6626 0.7060 0.7313 0.7629 0.7575 0.7576 0.7542 0.7889 0.7844 0.7641 0.6788
10 0.6235 0.6438 0.6393 0.6333 0.6802 0.6962 0.6890 0.6938 0.7055 0.7125 0.7498 0.7910 0.8254 0.8288 0.8374 0.8297 0.8423 0.8384 0.8399 0.7358
25 0.7046 0.7326 0.7295 0.7213 0.7860 0.8141 0.8169 0.8269 0.8342 0.8472 0.8868 0.9357 0.9610 0.9649 0.9713 0.9728 0.9912 0.9846 0.9836 0.8840
50 0.9034 0.9331 0.9273 0.9296 1.0383 1.0824 1.0951 1.1096 1.1118 1.1297 1.1562 1.2058 1.2385 1.2453 1.2667 1.2648 1.2981 1.2934 1.2931 1.1619
75 1.2927 1.3561 1.3475 1.3422 1.5744 1.6560 1.6803 1.7245 1.7128 1.7352 1.7589 1.8660 1.8929 1.8852 1.9214 1.9170 1.9816 1.9739 1.9783 1.7560
90 1.9460 2.0676 2.0388 2.0743 2.6268 2.7810 2.7970 2.9481 2.9451 2.9545 2.9622 3.1732 3.2758 3.1991 3.2035 3.2356 3.3774 3.3765 3.3882 2.9549
95 2.5560 2.6992 2.6382 2.7455 3.4043 3.6363 3.7412 3.9152 3.9140 3.9651 3.9337 4.2292 4.3947 4.3393 4.3708 4.4387 4.6786 4.6931 4.6970 4.0104
99 3.9747 4.2277 4.2957 4.6106 6.0351 6.5558 6.9905 7.2697 7.1583 7.2361 7.1608 7.5327 7.7271 7.5760 7.7910 7.8670 8.3439 8.3873 8.2635 7.2615
Range ratios
95/5 4.3545 4.4505 4.4621 4.6641 5.3352 5.5756 5.8067 6.0629 5.9324 5.9838 5.5717 5.7828 5.7609 5.7285 5.7696 5.8851 5.9303 5.9832 6.1474 5.9079
90/10 3.1211 3.2115 3.1894 3.2751 3.8621 3.9945 4.0596 4.2492 4.1747 4.1465 3.9507 4.0117 3.9688 3.8597 3.8255 3.8996 4.0099 4.0272 4.0341 4.0159





Total 38.2165 1.0018 38.15
Workers' characteristics:
gender
Male 36.3965 1.2137 29.99
Female 16.1452 0.5894 27.39
educ
Pre-primary or no education 1.5865 0.1705 9.30
First stage of basic education 7.7111 0.2791 27.63
Second stage of basic education 10.6261 0.7390 14.38
Secondary or post-secondary education 17.4963 1.2608 13.88
First stage of tertiary education 19.4688 2.6975 7.22
Second stage of tertiary education 41.6678 4.6934 8.88
Firms' characteristics:
inds6
Mining and quarrying 25.6579 0.7421 34.57
Manufacturing 36.7146 0.7019 52.31
Electricity, gas, and water supply 316.6787 1.5856 199.72
Construction 7.7563 0.7682 10.10
Market services 38.9309 1.2761 30.51
Social services 31.4632 1.2372 25.43
size
< 5 employees 1.4303 0.2021 7.08
5-9 employees 4.5583 0.3251 14.02
10-49 employees 31.0635 0.6080 51.09
50-99 employees 137.1016 0.9308 147.29
100-249 employees 456.0715 1.2467 365.81
250-499 employees 995.9859 1.3978 712.52
500-999 employees 2.060.9589 1.3775 1.496.19
1,000-1,999 employees 5.437.2047 1.7777 3.058.65
2,000-4,999 employees 12.437.6790 1.7423 7.138.49
≥ 5,000 employees 35.673.6580 1.8885 18.889.65
region
Norte 21.2746 0.6693 31.79
Centro 9.9644 0.5259 18.95
Lisboa 73.9201 1.6121 45.85
Alentejo 11.1877 0.6304 17.75
Algarve 5.5049 0.5255 10.48
Mean sum of squares




Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat; extraction of crude petroleum and natural 
gas; service activities incidental to oil and gas extraction, excluding surveying; mining 
of uranium and thorium ores
Industry 2 Mining of metal ores; other mining and quarrying
Industry 3 Manufacture of food products and beverages; manufacture of tobacco products
Industry 4 Manufacture of textiles; manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
Industry 5
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness 
and footwear
Industry 6
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture 
of articles of straw and plaiting materials
Industry 7
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products; publishing printing and reproduction 
of recorded media
Industry 8 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
Industry 9 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
Industry 10 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
Industry 11 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
Industry 12
Manufacture of basic metals; manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment
Industry 13 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
Industry 14
Manufacture of office machinery and computers; manufacture of electrical machinery 
and apparatus n.e.c.; manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment 
and apparatus; manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and 
clocks
Industry 15
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers; manufacture of other 
transport equipment
Industry 16 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling
Industry 17




Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of 
automotive fuel; wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal 
and household goods
Industry 20 Hotels and restaurants
Industry 21
Land transport; transport via pipelines; water transport; air transport; supporting and 
auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies; post and telecommunications
Industry 22
Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding; insurance and pension 
funding, except compulsory social security; activities auxiliary to financial 
intermediation
Industry 23
Real estate activities; renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of 
personal and household goods; computer and related activities; research and 
development; other business activities
Industry 24 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security
Industry 25 Education
Industry 26 Health and social work
Industry 27
Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities; activities of membership 
organizations n.e.c.; recreational, cultural and sporting activities; other service 
activities
Industry 28 Private households with employed persons
Industry 29 Extra-territorial organizations and bodiesBanco de Portugal | Working Papers i
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